

# A Secure Internet Voting Protocol Based on Non-interactive Deniable Authentication Protocol and Proof Protocol that Two Ciphertexts are Encryption of the Same Plaintext

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**Abstract**—Internet voting protocol is the base of the Internet voting systems. Firstly, an improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext is introduced. Secondly, a receipt-free and coercion-resistant Internet voting protocol based on the non-interactive deniable authentication protocol and an improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext is developed. Thirdly, we analyze the proposed Internet voting protocol. The proposed Internet voting protocol has the properties of universal verifiability, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. At the same time the proposed protocol is with the weak physical assumption. Lastly, we compare security properties of the several typical Internet voting protocols with our present protocol.

**Index Terms**—security protocol, universal verifiability, receipt-freeness, coercion-resistance, physical assumption

## I. INTRODUCTION

With the progress of society and development of democracy of nation, the needs of the voting are more and more intense. Owing to the popularity of Internet, many transactions can be processed through Internet, so the people have the higher requirements of Internet voting. Internet voting protocol is the base of the Internet voting system.

Internet voting protocol can be classified into two classes based on if they need authority. One needs not authority, such as [1]. This kind of protocol is fewer. The other needs authority, which can be categorized by different technologies into three schemes.

The first is homomorphic scheme, such as [2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17]. The voter cooperates with the authorities in order to construct an encryption of his vote. Due to the homomorphic property, an encryption of the sum of the votes is obtained by multiplying the encrypted ballots of all voters. Finally, the result of the election is computed from the sum of the votes, which is jointly decrypted by the authorities. The purposes of homomorphic encryption method are protection of the voter's privacy and advancement of the efficacy of tally ballots. Generally the homomorphic

encryption scheme is not receipt-free. The first voting protocol of this scheme was introduced by Benaloh[15]. Crameret et al. protocol [4] proposed by is representative.

The second is blind signature scheme, such as [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. Fujioka et al. protocol [20] is representative. Generally the blind signatures scheme is not receipt-free because the blinding factor is the receipt. The voter firstly obtains a token, a blindly signed message unknown to anyone except himself. Next, the voter sends his token together with his vote. These protocols require voter's participation in more rounds. Generally the protocols need two authorities. One is administrator which responsible for issuing the ballots and generating the blind signature of ballots. The other is collector which responsible for tallying the ballot and publish the result.

The third is mix net scheme, such as [8, 13, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. These protocols use the mix net to implement the privacy. The key idea of Mix nets is to permute and modify the sequence of objects in order to hide the correspondence between elements of original and final sequence. David Chaum introduced this idea in 1981 as a realization of anonymous channel. Internet voting protocols of mix net scheme use the mix net to mix the possible ballot and send done permutations secretly to the voter.

The secure and practical Internet voting protocol should have the following properties:

Basic properties: privacy, completeness, soundness, unreuseability, fairness, eligibility, and invariableness.

Expanded properties: universal verifiability, receipt-freeness [2, 18], coercion-resistance [12]

✿ Universal verifiability: Any one can verify the fact that the election is fair and the published tally is correctly computed from the ballots that were correctly cast.

✿ Receipt-freeness: The voter can not produce a receipt to prove that he votes a special ballot. Its purpose is to protect against vote buying. Receipt-freeness was introduced by Benaloh and Tuinstra [2]. They proposed a receipt-free scheme based on the voting-booth. Hirt and

Sako [8] point out that their scheme is not receipt-freeness.

✱ Coercion-resistance [12]: A coercion-resistant voting protocol should offer not only receipt-freeness, but also defense against randomization, forced-abstention, and simulation attacks.

At present the hot point is how to realize universal verifiability, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance with few assumption or constraints. There are three traditional methods: secure multi-party computation [42], deniable encryption [38] and designated verifier proof [10, 12, 40] to implement the receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. According to our analysis we found that the three methods in Internet voting protocol have several problems. So in this paper we apply a new method: deniable authentication protocol and proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext to implement the receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance.

The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.

1. An improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext is developed.

2. A receipt-free and coercion-resistant Internet voting protocol based on non-interactive deniable authentication protocol and an improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext is introduced.

**Organization of the paper:** In Section II the related work is discussed. An improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext is proposed in Section III. In Section IV a brief overview Meng non-interactive deniable authentication protocol that is used in the proposed Internet voting protocol is presented. In Section V the secure Internet voting protocol with receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance is proposed. Then we analyze the proposed protocol in Section VI.

## II. RELATED WORK

In the past a lot of Internet voting protocols uses ad hoc physical assumption to accomplish receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance, Such as, one or two-way untappable channels and/or anonymous or private channels [5, 8, 12, 18, 26], third-party honest verifiers [35], smartcards [29], voting booth [2, 33], the third randomizer [5, 13, 34], tamper-resistant randomizer [9].

At present the hot point is how to realize universal verifiability, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance with few physical assumptions. There are three traditional methods: secure multi-party computation [42], deniable encryption [38] and designated verifier proof [10, 12, 40] to implement the receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance.

Zhong et al. [42] use secure multi-party computation to implement the receipt-freeness. But in Zhong et al. protocol the voter need to involve the all phase, which is not comfortable for the voter's experience. At the same time it uses the secure channel to implement the receipt-freeness, which is a very strong physical assumption.

Rjajškov'a [38] uses the deniable encryption to implement the receipt-freeness. Because deniable

encryption is only process one bit in each run this method can not support the other voting ballot forms. Such as chose one from many, write in ballot.

Juels et al. [12] researched coercion-resistance firstly. Acquisti protocol[10] applies the idea of Juels et al. [12]. Juels et al. [12] and Acquisti [10] mainly applied the credential of voter and designated verifier proof to accomplish it. Voter can cheat the coercer by producing a false credential. Owing to designate verifier proof the coercer can not verify the proof.

The key idea of Juels [12] is that for the identity of a voter to remain hidden during the election process and for the validity of ballots instead to be checked blindly against a voter roll. When casting a ballot, a voter incorporates a concealed credential. This takes the form of a ciphertext on a secret value that is unique to the voter. The secret value is a kind of anonymous credential. To ensure that legitimate voters cast ballots, the tallying authority performs a blind comparison between hidden credentials and a list of encrypted credentials published by an election registrar alongside of the plaintext names of registered voters.

According to our analysis we found that it has the following problems: (1) can not prevent the "1009 attacks"; (2) do not defense against forced-abstention and simulation attacks ;(3) can not support write in ballot.

In Acquisti protocol [10] the election authorities provide shares of credentials to each voter, along with designated verifier proofs of each share's validity. Using homomorphic encryption, the voter assembles the shares and combines them with her own vote that is cast on a public bulletin board. All messages in the bulletin board can be decrypted by a coalition of the election authorities after the voting phase of the election is completed.

But according to our analysis of Acquisti protocol [10], we find that it has the following problems:

a. It is not invariableness.

In Acquisti protocol the voter can use per credential to vote many times. In other words the voter can use per credential to vote the same ballot many times and also can use per credential to vote different ballot many times. In the tallying phrase the author only deals with the status that the voter can use per credential to vote the same ballot many times. The other status that voter can use per credential to vote different ballot many times does not be considered. So on that status we use the search algorithm in the tallying phrase, the tally result may be different. So it is not property of invariableness. This is an important problem.

b. It is not receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance.

According to the definition of coercion-resistance we know that if an Internet protocol is not receipt-free, it is not coercion-resistant. So we firstly point that Acquisti protocol is not receipt-freeness.

In Acquisti protocol  $E^{v_j} (E^V (c_{i,j}), P_{v_j})$  is send by the authority through a trappable channel. That means the vote buyer can get  $E^{v_j} (E^V (c_{i,j}), P_{v_j})$  and know that it is

send by the authority.  $E^{v_j}$  represents RSA encryption under  $v_j$ 's public key.

The voter can prove that  $E^V(c_{i,j}), P_{v_j}$  is the decryption of  $E^{v_j}(E^V(c_{i,j}), P_{v_j})$  with the public key of  $v_j$  and the property of RSA encryption.  $E^S(E^V(C_j + B_j^t))$  is published on the bulletin board. Generally voter can successfully verify the designated verifier proof  $P_{v_j}$  of equality between  $E^V(c_{i,j})$  and the corresponding  $E^C(c_{i,j})$ . So the voter can reveal how to generate the vote  $E^S(E^V(C_j + B_j^t))$  that is compatible with the receipt  $E^S(E^V(C_j + B_j^t))$  and  $E^{v_j}(E^V(c_{i,j}), P_{v_j})$ . So Acquisti protocol is not receipt-freeness.

According to the definition of coercion-resistance Acquisti protocol is not coercion-resistance.

Meng protocol [40] is a practical and efficient Internet voting protocol with the secure properties and addresses the problems of Acquisti protocol. At the same time Meng protocol has the following specialties:(1)Have the properties of privacy, completeness, soundness, fairness, invariableness, universal verifiability, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance;(2) Without of strong physical assumption;(3) Solve the problems that have not property of invariableness, can not prevent the "1009 attacks" and application of the tappable channel in Acquisti protocol.

In this paper we apply a new method, which is deniable authentication protocol and proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext, to implement receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance.

Deniable authentication protocol allow a sender to authenticate a message for a receiver, in a way that the receiver can not convince a third party that such authentication (or any authentication) ever took place. Deniable authentication has two characteristics that differ from traditional authentication:

1. Only the intended receiver can authenticate the true source of a given message.
2. The receiver can't prove the source of the message to a third party.

In the past the deniable authentication protocol has been studied. The deniable authentication protocol can be fall into two categories: interactive deniable authentication protocols and non-interactive deniable authentication protocols [41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48]. The interactive deniable authentication protocols are inefficient. Hence research on non-interactive deniable authentication protocols is the future direction. All the protocols [41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48] have not strong deniability. Meng non-interactive deniable authentication protocol [41] based on discrete logarithm problem has secure properties: completeness, strong deniability, weak deniability, security of forgery attack, security of

impersonate attack, security of compromising session secret attack, and security of man-in-the-middle attack.

To our knowledge the research on the proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext is at the beginning. Baudron et al. [5] proposed an interactive proof protocol based on paillier cryptosystem. Acquisti [10] applied the idea of Baudron et al and proposed an interactive proof protocol based on paillier cryptosystem with the condition  $p=2$ . Goulet et al.[11] proposed an interactive protocol based on ElGamal cryptosystem. But we found that Goulet et al' proof protocol is wrong. We give an improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext.

So we use Meng non-interactive deniable authentication protocol and an improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext to implement the receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance.

### III. AN IMPROVED PROOF PROTOCOL THAT TWO CIPHERTEXTS ARE ENCRYPTION OF THE SAME PLAINTEXT

To our knowledge the research on the proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext is at the beginning. Baudron et al. [5] proposed an interactive proof protocol based on paillier cryptosystem. Acquisti [10] applied the idea of Baudron et al. and proposed an interactive proof protocol based on paillier cryptosystem with the condition  $p=2$ . Goulet et al. [11] proposed an interactive protocol based on ElGamal cryptosystem. But we found that Goulet et al.' proof protocol is wrong. In the following we address the problem of Goulet et al. and give an improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext:

In the protocol we need two public and private keys:  $(p, g, h_v), \alpha_v, h_v = g^{\alpha_v}$ ;  $(p, g, h_c), \alpha_c, h_c = g^{\alpha_c}$ ,  $g$  is a generator of multiplicative  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ .

Prover proves to the verifier that  $(x_v, y_v) = (g^{r_v}, h_v^{r_v} m)$  and  $(x_c, y_c) = (g^{r_c}, h_c^{r_c} m)$  are the ciphertexts of the same  $m$  with the public key  $(p, g, h_v)$  and  $(p, g, h_c)$ . At the same time prover does not tell verifier  $r_v, r_c$ .

✿ Prover computes:

$$(x_v, y_v) = (g^{r_v}, h_v^{r_v} m), (x_c, y_c) = (g^{r_c}, h_c^{r_c} m)$$

$$r \in \mathbb{Z}_p, (x_1, y_1) = (g^r, h_v^r m), (x_2, y_2) = (g^r, h_c^r m)$$

$$a_1 = \frac{x_v}{x_1}, a_2 = \frac{x_1}{x_2}, a_3 = \frac{x_2}{x_c}$$

$$b_1 = \frac{y_v}{y_1}, b_2 = \frac{y_1}{y_2}, b_3 = \frac{y_2}{y_c}$$

sends  $(a_1, a_2, a_3, b_1, b_2, b_3)$  to verifier

✿ Verifier checks:

$$a_1 a_2 a_3 \stackrel{?}{=} \frac{x_v}{x_c}, b_1 b_2 b_3 \stackrel{?}{=} \frac{y_v}{y_c}$$

Verifier selects a random value  $c$  from  $c \in \{0, 1, 2\}$  the set and sends  $c$  to the prover.

✱ Prover computes:

$$\text{If: } \begin{cases} c = 0, \text{ prove } \log_g a_1 = \log_{h_c} b_1 \\ c = 1, \text{ prove } \log_g a_2 = \log_{h_c} b_2 \\ c = 2, \text{ prove } \log_g a_3 = \log_{h_c} b_3 \end{cases}$$

sends to verifier.

If we repeat the above procedure  $z$  times, we see that a lying prover only succeeds with a probability of  $\left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^z$ , which is a probability that shrinks quickly if we repeat enough times. Thus, the verifier can be sure with a large probability that the plaintext equivalence is true after a number of run of this proof.

#### IV. AN OVERVIEW OF MENG NON-INTERACTIVE DENIABLE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL

Meng non-interactive deniable authentication protocol is the secure and has properties: completeness, strong deniability, weak deniability, security of forgery attack, security of impersonate attack, security of compromising session secret attack, and security of man-in-the-middle attack.

✱ Strong deniability [49]: After execution of the deniable authentication protocol the sender can deny to have ever authenticated anything to receiver.

✱ Weak deniability [49]: The deniable authentication protocol is deniable. The receiver can prove to have spoken to the sender but not the content of what the sender authenticated in a way that the receiver can't convince a third party that such authentication.

Meng protocol supposes that the attacker can not monitor the communication between the sender and receiver in the non-interactive deniable authentication protocol.

Meng non-interactive deniable authentication protocol is briefly described as the following:

✱ Initialized phrase

The Authority chooses a large prime numbers  $p$ , and computes a random multiplicative generator element  $g$  in finite field of  $p$  elements:  $GF(p)$ . Lastly he sends the  $g, p$  to the bulletin board.

The sender picks a serial random numbers  $r_i \in {}_U Z_{p-1}$   $S_{PR}^i = r_i$   $i = 1 \dots l$ , and computes his public key by  $S_{PU}^i = g^{r_i} \pmod p$   $i = 1 \dots l$ . Lastly, sender sends the  $S_{PU}^i$  to the bulletin board.

The receiver picks a random numbers  $x \in {}_U Z_{p-1}$   $R_{PR} = x$ , and computes his public key by  $R_{PU} = g^x \pmod p$ . Lastly, the sender sends the  $R_{PU}$  to the bulletin board.

When finishing the initialized phrase the sender has serial public and private keys  $(S_{PU}^i, S_{PR}^i)$ , at the same time receiver has his public and private keys  $(R_{PU}, R_{PR})$

Hash ( $m$ ) is a collision-free hash function with an input of  $m$  and output of  $q$  bits:  $q = \text{Hash}(m)$

✱ Execution of protocol phrase

$M$  is the message sent to the receiver.

Sender performs:

(1) Chooses randomly a public and private key  $(S_{PU}^t, S_{PR}^t)$ . the private and public keys of each run of the propose protocol are different.

(2) Computes:  $\delta = \text{hash}(m) S_{PR}^t \pmod q$  and forgets  $(S_{PU}^t, S_{PR}^t)$  after a certain time.  $k = (R_{PU})^\delta \pmod p$   $\text{hash}(k || m) = MAC$  and sends  $(S_{PU}^t, MAC, m)$  to the receiver.

Receiver computes:

$$(1) k' = \left[ (S_{PU}^t)^{\text{hash}(m)} \right]^{R_{PR}} \pmod p$$

(2) Verifies  $\text{hash}(k' || m) \stackrel{?}{=} MAC$ . if the result is true, the receiver accepts it. Otherwise the receiver rejects it.

The proof of security can be found in Ref. [41]

#### V. THE PROPOSED SECURE INTERNET VOTING PROTOCOL

The idea of the proposed secure Internet voting protocol with receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance is that: if everyone knows that the voter has the ability that generates the fake evidence, when the voter provides the evidence to the vote-buyer, the voter-buyer has not the ability to verify the evidence, so the vote-buyer does not give the money to the voter. So the proposed Internet voting protocol has receipt-freeness and against of and randomization attack.

How to make the voter to have ability that generates the fake evidence? Owing to the strong deniability of Meng non-interactive deniable authentication protocol we can use it to implement the ability.

The proposed Internet voting protocol applies the encryption technologies which include threshold ElGamal cryptosystem, mix net [27, 36], homomorphic encryption, Meng non-interactive deniable authentication protocol and the improved proof protocol that knowledge that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext.

##### A. The protocol

The proposed Internet voting protocol includes four phases: preparation phase, registration phase, voting phase and tallying phase.

✱ Notation definition

BB: bulletin board;

$A_i$  ( $i = 1, 2, \dots, s$ ): the  $i$ th authority;

$V_j$  ( $j = 1, 2, \dots, l$ ): the  $j$ th legal voter;

$B^t$ : ballot voted  $t$ ;

$c_{i,j}$ ,  $j = 1, \dots, l$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, d$ :  $A_i$  creates the random number for  $V_j$ . It is the credential share of  $V_j$ ;

$C_j$ : credential  $V_j$ ;

$PK^C, SK_i^C, VK^C, VK_i^C$  : the threshold cryptosystem of  $A_i$ , which is used to encrypt and decrypt  $c_{i,j}$  ;  
 $PK^V, SK_i^V, VK^V, VK_i^V$  : the threshold cryptosystem of  $A_i$ , which is used to encrypt and decrypt  $B^t$  and  $c_{i,j}$  ;  
 $PK_i, SK_i$  : the public key and private key of  $A_i$ , which is used when voter register;  
 $PK_j, SK_j$  : the public key and private key of  $V_j$ ;  
 $E^V(m)$  : encrypt m with  $PK^V$  ;  
 $E^C(m)$  : encrypt m with  $PK^C$  ;  
 $SK(m)$  : sign m with private key  $SK$  ;  
 $\phi$  : mix operation;  
 $HASH(m)$  : the value of HASH functions with m;  
 $ENV_{PK}(m)$  : digital envelope of m with the public key  $PK$  ;  
 $Ident_j$ : identification of  $V_j$  ;  
 $Proof_{V_j}^A$  : the non-interactive deniable proof evidence of knowledge that and  $E^V(c_{i,j})$  are encryption of the same  $c_{i,j}$ , which is produced by  $A_i$  for  $V_j$  .




Figure 1. Registration phase.

✿ Preparation phase

Authorities and voters generate the public/private ElGamal keys. The private keys of voter and authorities are secret

Authorities generate the ballot  $B^t$  and send  $B^t$  and its digital signature to bulletin board denoted by BB.

✿ Registration phase

(1) Firstly voter  $V_j$  generates  $Ident_j$  , secondly generates message  $ENV_{PK_i}(SK_j(Ident_j), Ident_j, PK_j)$  and send it to the authority  $A_i$  . Authority  $A_i$  receives the message and uses its private key to open the digital envelope. Authority  $A_i$  checks  $Ident_j$  that if it has registered. If it has registered, Authority  $A_i$  sends the error message to  $V_j$  . The protocol ends. If it has not registered, Authority  $A_i$  verifies  $SK_j(Ident_j)$  . If the verification is wrong, Authority  $A_i$  sends the error message to  $V_j$  , the protocol ends. If the verification is right, Authority  $A_i$  execute (2) step.

(2) Authority  $A_i$  firstly generates  $E^V(c_{i,j})$  , secondly generates  $Proof_{V_j}^A$  based on Meng non-interactive deniable protocol and the improved proof protocol that knowledge that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext with ElGamal cryptosystem. Lastly Authority  $A_i$  generates  $ENV_{PK_j}(E^V(c_{i,j}), Proof_{V_j}^A)$  . Authority  $A_i$  sends  $PK_j$  to other authorities. Other authorities generate  $ENV_{PK_j}(E^V(c_{i,j}), Proof_{V_j}^A)$  ( $i = 1, \dots, i-1, i+1, \dots, s$ ) at the same method. Authority  $A_i$  gets  $ENV_{PK_j}(E^V(c_{i,j}), Proof_{V_j}^A)$  ( $i = 1, \dots, i-1, i+1, \dots, s$ ) and sends  $ENV_{PK_j}(E^V(c_{i,j}), Proof_{V_j}^A)$  ( $i = 1, \dots, i, \dots, s$ ) to voter  $V_j$  by anonymous channel. Authority  $A_i$  generates  $(E^C(c_{i,j}))SK_{A_i}$  , and sends  $E^C(c_{i,j})$  and  $(E^C(c_{i,j}))SK_{A_i}$  ( $i = 1, \dots, i, \dots, s$ ) to BB. Voter  $V_j$  receives  $Proof_{V_j}^A$  and verifies it. If it is right,  $V_j$  generates

$$\prod_{j=j,i=1,\dots,s} (E^V(c_{i,j})) = E^V\left(\prod_{j=j,i=1,\dots,s} c_{i,j}\right) \equiv E^V(C_j)$$

✿ Voting phase




Figure 2. Voting phase

$V_j$  chooses one ballot and generate  $E^V(B_j^t)$  and send  $E^V(C_j), E^V(B_j^t)$  to Table I randomly in BB.

✿ Tallying phase

(1) According to the rules the authorities eliminate the duplicate  $E^V(C_j)$  and its corresponding  $E^V(B_j^t)$  in Table I. The results store in Table II.

(2) Authority mixes  $E^C(C_j)$  in table III and  $E^V(C_j), E^V(B_j^t)$  in table II. The corresponding results are  $E^C(C_{\phi(j)})$  and  $E^V(C_{\phi(j)})$  ,  $E^V(B_{\phi(j)}^t)$  . Authority stores  $E^C(C_{\phi(j)})$  in Table IV and  $E^V(C_{\phi(j)}), E^V(B_{\phi(j)}^t)$  in Table V.

(3) Authorities decrypt  $E^C(C_{\phi(j)})$  in Table IV and  $E^V(C_{\phi(j)})$  in Table V. In order to verify correctness of decryption by people, authority stores the proof of correctness of decryption in Table IV and Table V respectively.

(4) According to  $C_{\phi(J)}$  in Table IV, authority finds  $E^V(B_{\phi(J)}^t)$  in Table V which is corresponding to  $C_{\phi(J)}$  that is equal to  $C_{\phi(J)}$  in Table IV. Authority stores  $E^V(B_{\phi(J)}^t)$  in Table VI.

(5) Authorities decrypt  $E^V(B_{\phi(J)}^t)$  in Table VI and get  $B_{\phi(J)}^t$ . The proof of correctness of decryption is stored in Table VI.

(6) Authority tallies the ballot in Table VI and stores its results in Table VI.

TABLE I. BALLOTS BEFORE TALLYING

$E^V(C_J)$	$E^V(B_J^t)$
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TABLE II. BALLOT ELIMINATED THE DUPLICATE

$E^V(C_J)$  AND ITS CORRESPONDING  $E^V(B_J^t)$

$E^V(C_J)$	$E^V(B_J^t)$
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TABLE III. THE  $E^C(C_J)$

$E^C(C_J)$
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TABLE IV. THE  $E^C(C_{\phi(J)})$

$E^C(C_{\phi(J)})$	Proof of correctness of decryption	$C_{\phi(J)}$
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TABLE V. THE  $E^V(C_{\phi(J)})$  AND  $E^V(B_{\phi(J)}^t)$

$E^V(C_{\phi(J)})$	Proof of correctness of decryption	$C_{\phi(J)}$	$E^V(B_{\phi(J)}^t)$
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TABLE VI. THE  $E^V(B_{\phi(J)}^t)$

$E^V(B_{\phi(J)}^t)$	proof of correctness of decryption	$B_{\phi(J)}^t$
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TABLE VII. THE RESULT TABLE

$t$	
$l$	
$\vdots$	
$t$	

VI.PROPERTIES ANALYSIS

Owing to the space limitation we only analysis universal verifiability, receipt-freeness, coercion-resistance.

✿ Universal verifiability

Anyone can verify the tallying results according the message in BB. Each step in tallying phase is public and can be verified.

Voter can check that their ballot  $E^V(C_J)$  and  $E^V(B_J^t)$  do appear on BB. If voter does not vote repeatedly, his ballot must appear in table 2. After mixing, voter can not recognize its ballot. But voter can check correctness of the mix operation by proof provided by mix server.

Voter can check correctness of decryption of  $E^C(C_{\phi(J)})$  in table 4,  $E^V(C_{\phi(J)})$  in table 5 and  $E^V(B_{\phi(J)}^t)$  in table 7 owing to threshold ElGamal cryptosystem.

So the proposed Internet voting protocol is universal verifiability.

✿ Receipt-freeness

The proposed Internet voting protocol accomplishes receipt-freeness by confidentiality of voter credential and the proposed deniable authentication protocol.

Voter checks equality between credential from authority and credential in BB by proof protocol that knowledge that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext  $Proof_{V_j}^A$ . Other peoples can not check owing to the specialty of the meng deniable authentication protocol. According to the Meng deniable authentication protocol voter has the ability of generation of a fake  $Proof_{V_j}^A$ . The vote-buyer can't check

$ENNV_{PK_j}(E^V(c_j), Proof_{V_j}^A)$  and can't verify  $E^V(c_j)$ . So the vote-buyer does not give the money to the voter.

So the protocol is receipt-freeness.

✿ Coercion-resistance

According to definition of coercion-resistance, firstly the protocol is receipt-freeness, and then prevents randomization attack, forced-abstention attack and simulation attack.

We have already analyzed that it is receipt-free. In the following we analyze that it can prevent randomization attack, Forced-abstention attack and simulation attack.

(1) Randomization attack

Voter wants to prevent randomization attack. He can generate a false credential to cheat coercer because coercer can not recognize it true or false. Then voter can use true credential to vote a ballot. So the protocol can prevent randomization attack.

(2) Forced-abstention attack

According to protocol coercer can not know if voter has registered based on BB and if voter has vote. So the protocol can prevent Forced-abstention attack.

(3) Simulation attack

Coercer can vote on voter behalf after getting private key of voter. But we suppose that the private key of voter is secret in our protocol. So the protocol can prevent simulation attack.

VII.CONCLUSION

Internet voting protocol is base of Internet voting system. In this paper Firstly, an improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext is introduced. Secondly, a receipt-free and coercion-resistant Internet voting protocol based on non-interactive deniable authentication protocol and an improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext is developed. Thirdly, we analyze the proposed Internet voting protocol. The proposed Internet voting protocol has the properties of universal verifiability, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance and do not use

the strong physical assumptions. Fourth, we compare security properties of Fujioka et al. [20], Cramer et al. [4], Juels et al. [12], Acquisti [10] protocols with our present protocol. Owing to the space limitation we only give the analyzed result described as in Table VIII.

In the future we will use the protocol analyzer ProVerif [50] based on the applied pi calculus to analyze the universal verifiability, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance properties of the proposed Internet voting protocol. At the same time we will develop an Internet voting system based on our proposed protocol.

TABLE VIII. COMPARING SECURITY PROPERTIES OF THE EARLIER SEVERAL TYPICAL PROTOCOLS WITH OUR PRESENT PROTOCOL. THE MARK“T” REPRESENTS THE PROTOCOL HAS THE PROPERTY; THE MARK“F”REPRESENTS HAS NOT THE PROPERTY

Properties	Fujioka et al. [20]	Cramer et al. [4]	Juels et al. [12]	Acquisti. [10]	Our present
Privacy	T	T	T	T	T
Completeness	T	T	T	T	T
Soundness	T	T	T	T	T
Unreusability	F	F	F	F	T
Fairness	T	T	T	T	T
Eligibility	T	F	F	F	T
Invariableness	T	T	T	F	T
Universal verifiability	T	T	T	T	T
Receipt-freeness	F	F	T	F	T
Coercion-resistance	F	F	F	F	T
Homomorphic scheme	F	T	F	T	T
Blind signature scheme	T	F	F	F	F
Mix net scheme	F	F	T	T	T
Designated verifier proof	F	F	T	T	F
Deniable authentication protocol	F	F	F	F	T

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